AI usage inside companies - Need visibility and governance.
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Ruben Castello
Employees are using OpenAI ChatGPT, Anthropic Claude, OpenClaw, browser copilots, AI extensions, personal API keys, and many other tools..... often without IT visibility.
Our IT departaments need
- What AI tools are being used
- What data is being uploaded or pasted
- If sensitive information is leaving the company
- Which tools are approved vs shadow AI
- How to manage risk without killing productivity
Many companies are blind here are risk is very high. Traditional firewalls and DNS filters are not enough.
In February during The Product Lab, they mentioned the idea of an AI Scraper to detect AI tool usage, APIs, exfiltration risks, and user activity. Two months later, that idea already feels necessary.
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Andy Roehrs
We have a lot of customers that are interested in gathering data about AI Usage Reporting.
I'm looking to see if anything like this is on the radar for Huntress.
Specifically, our customers are looking to investigate what end-users are using AI platforms and software on their managed endpoints.
Is this something that Huntress is looking at as a part of the Agent-Based software on endpoints? We assume that some of this is being monitored on endpoints from the EDR perspective, but we understand this type of monitoring comes from analyzing traffic/DNS and user activity.
If this is not something that Huntress is working on, we are looking into other products that may have some overlap with Huntress features, such as Proofpoint Zen/AI Security.
I'd prefer to keep monitoring of AI usage under the Huntress umbrella if possible.
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perry schmidlechner
Inforcer has said they use M365 cloud app discovery (requires business premium) for their Shadow AI monitoring, so should be doable by Huntress?
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Orel Einy
I agree the risk is real, and credit to Huntress for recently announcing on Managed ESPM, which brings application control into the platform and will most likely be able to address AI risks originating from desktop apps (e.g., unsanctioned binaries, local model runtimes).
The bigger exposure today is indeed browser-based: SaaS LLMs, prompt-level data leakage, unsanctioned copilots running entirely in a tab. Endpoint and browser are complementary control planes, while ESPM may cover one half; the browser half is still open.
I advise the product teams to consider a capability for the secure browsing layer, or expand Managed SIEM to ingest telemetry from enterprise browsers and SASE/CASB vendors so that correlation happens on Huntress's side instead of being stitched together by the MSP/MSSP.
If both options are available in the future (or any other approach to cover both endpoint level and browser level), the coverage level would be very valuable to both customers and partners.
Prejay
I've now seen a few services offerings like www.atakama.com spring up to help solve this visibilty issue. I do feel like Huntress could help surface data between it's agent and Defender's data collection instead of requiring the browser add-in but perhaps not and a partnership option could work here instead of Huntress aren't interested in the browser extension play?
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Michael Gibby
Surely EDR (or via Defender) can add in functionality to detect installed apps like Claude and detect URL's being accessed for the web interface AI's?
Jonathan
I don't think Huntress has that level of network visibility, but I could be wrong.